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Abstract
Background: Among American Conservatives, but not Liberals, trust in science has been declining since the 1970’s. Climate
science has become particularly polarized, with Conservatives being more likely than Liberals to reject the notion that
greenhouse gas emissions are warming the globe. Conversely, opposition to genetically-modified (GM) foods and
vaccinations is often ascribed to the political Left although reliable data are lacking. There are also growing indications that
rejection of science is suffused by conspiracist ideation, that is the general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories
including the specific beliefs that inconvenient scientific findings constitute a ‘‘hoax.’’
Methodology/Principal findings: We conducted a propensity weighted internet-panel survey of the U.S. population and
show that conservatism and free-market worldview strongly predict rejection of climate science, in contrast to their weaker
and opposing effects on acceptance of vaccinations. The two worldview variables do not predict opposition to GM.
Conspiracist ideation, by contrast, predicts rejection of all three scientific propositions, albeit to greatly varying extents.
Greater endorsement of a diverse set of conspiracy theories predicts opposition to GM foods, vaccinations, and climate
science.
Conclusions: Free-market worldviews are an important predictor of the rejection of scientific findings that have potential
regulatory implications, such as climate science, but not necessarily of other scientific issues. Conspiracist ideation, by
contrast, is associated with the rejection of all scientific propositions tested. We highlight the manifold cognitive reasons
why conspiracist ideation would stand in opposition to the scientific method. The involvement of conspiracist ideation in
the rejection of science has implications for science communicators.
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Introduction
The U.S. public has become increasingly polarized in their
attitudes towards science. Since the 1970’s, Conservatives—unlike
Liberals or Moderates—have become increasingly skeptical and
distrustful of science [1]. Polarization is particularly pronounced
with respect to climate change: People who embrace a laissez-faire
vision of the free market are less likely to accept that anthropo-
genic greenhouse gas emissions are warming the planet than
people with an egalitarian-communitarian outlook [2–7]. Al-
though the crucial role of cultural worldviews in determining
beliefs about climate science is now well established, at least two
important questions remain unanswered.
First, it is unknown how worldviews shape people’s opinions
about other controversial scientific issues, such as genetically-
modified (GM) foods and childhood vaccinations, both of which
have attracted considerable opposition. A better understanding of
the role of worldview vis-a´-vis those issues is important not only in
its own right but also because it can triangulate the reasons why
climate science has become so ideologically disputed. For example,
if fear of government regulation of businesses were the sole factor
underlying Conservatives’ opposition to climate science [8], then
one would expect them to embrace GM foods, like other new
technologies [9], because of the associated business opportunities.
If Conservatives were found to oppose GM foods, by contrast, this
would point towards a more general opposition to science that
transcends pragmatic considerations. Although media reports have
implicated the political Left in the opposition to GM foods [10,11],
European surveys have variously associated GM-food rejection
with the extreme political Right [12] as well as the political Left
[13]. We are not aware of any equivalent peer-reviewed research
in the U.S. A similar ambiguity arises with respect to vaccinations.
Media reports have ascribed an anti-vaccine stance to the political
Left [14], largely based on the political leanings of spokespersons.
By contrast, research has linked opposition to mandatory human-
papillomavirus (HPV) immunizations against cervical cancer to
free-market and individualistic worldviews [15], perhaps reflecting
fears of government intrusion into parental sovereignty. Likewise,
social conservatives have taken a contrarian stance because HPV
is transmitted primarily through sexual contact, thereby associat-
ing vaccinations with potential promiscuity [16]. To resolve these
ambiguities, we examined the role of worldviews in determining
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Table 1. Questionnaire items used in the survey and their short names.
Item name Item (R = reverse scored)
1. Climate science
CNatFluct I believe that the climate is always changing and what we are currently observing is just natural fluctuation. (R)
CdueGHG I believe that most of the warming over the last 50 years is due to the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations.
CseriousDamage I believe that the burning of fossil fuels over the last 50 years has caused serious damage to the planet’s climate.
CO2causesCC Human CO2 emissions cause climate change.
HumansInsign Humans are too insignificant to have an appreciable impact on global temperature. (R)
2. GM Foods
GMimportant I believe that genetic modification is an important and viable contribution to help feed the world’s rapidly growing population.
GMdamageEnv I believe genetically engineered foods have already damaged the environment. (R)
GMtested The consequences of genetic modification have been tested exhaustively in the lab, and only foods that have been found safe will be
made available to the public.
GMdangerous I believe that because there are so many unknowns, that it is dangerous to manipulate the natural genetic material of foods. (R)
GMsafe Genetic modification of foods is a safe and reliable technology.
3. Vaccinations
VaxSafe I believe that vaccines are a safe and reliable way to help avert the spread of preventable diseases.
VaxNegSide I believe that vaccines have negative side effects that outweigh the benefits of vaccination for children. (R)
VaxTested Vaccines are thoroughly tested in the laboratory and wouldnJt be made available to the public unless it was known that they are safe.
VaxRisky The risk of vaccinations to maim and kill children outweighs their health benefits. (R)
VaxContribHealth Vaccinations are one of the most significant contributions to public health.
4. Conservatism – Liberalism
PLiberal I am politically more liberal than conservative. (R)
PRepub In any election, given a choice between a Republican and a Democratic candidate, I will select the Republican over the Democrat.
PCommunismFailed Communism has been proven to be a failed political ideology.
PNeverConserv I cannot see myself ever voting to elect conservative candidates. (R)
PMediaLeft The major national media are too left-wing for my taste.
PSocialismOK Socialism has many advantages over capitalism. (R)
PLeft On balance, I lean politically more to the left than to the right. (R)
5. Free market
FMUnresBest An economic system based on free markets unrestrained by government interference automatically works best to meet human needs.
FMLimitSocial The free market system may be efficient for resource allocation but it is limited in its capacity to promote social justice. (R)
FMMoreImp The preservation of the free market system is more important than localized environmental concerns.
FMThreatEnv Free and unregulated markets pose important threats to sustainable development. (R)
FMUnsustain The free market system is likely to promote unsustainable consumption. (R)
6. Conspiracist ideation
CYNewWorldOrder A powerful and secretive group known as the New World Order are planning to eventually rule the world through an autonomous
world government which would replace sovereign governments.
CYMLK The assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. was the result of an organized conspiracy by U.S. government agencies such as the CIA and
FBI.
CYMoon The Apollo moon landings never happened and were staged in a Hollywood film studio.
CYJFK The assassination of John F. Kennedy was not committed by the lone gunman Lee Harvey Oswald but was rather a detailed organized
conspiracy to kill the President.
CY911 The U.S. government allowed the 9–11 attacks to take place so that it would have an excuse to achieve foreign (e.g., wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq) and domestic (e.g., attacks on civil liberties) goals that had been determined prior to the attacks.
CYDiana Princess Diana’s death was not an accident but rather an organised assassination by members of the British royal family who disliked
her.
Predictors of Rejection of Science
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the American public’s attitudes towards GM foods and vaccina-
tions using established measures of worldviews in a representative
survey.
Second, a striking feature of the opposition to climate science is
that worldview-driven polarization often increases with greater
levels of education [3] and greater science literacy [17], suggesting
that the opposition reflects a cognitive style rather than a deficit of
knowledge or ability. One cognitive style that has been repeatedly
implicated in science denial is conspiratorial thinking [18–21], also
known as conspiracist ideation. Denial of the link between HIV
and AIDS frequently involves conspiracist hypotheses, for example
that AIDS was created by the U.S. Government [22–24]. Popular
books critical of climate science routinely refer to global warming
as a ‘‘conspiracy’’ or ‘‘hoax’’ [25], and conspiracist themes have
been identified in climate media coverage [26] and in people’s
affective imagery evoked by climate change [21]. Among visitors
to climate blogs, the tendency to endorse conspiracy theories has
been shown to be correlated with the rejection of climate science
as well as the rejection of other scientific propositions [27].
Likewise, analyses of YouTube videos critical of HPV vaccinations
[28] and anti-vaccination blogs [29] have revealed widespread
conspiratorial content.
The prominence of conspiracist ideation in science rejection is
not unexpected in light of its cognitive attributes: For example, if a
scientific consensus cannot be accepted as the result of researchers
converging independently on the same evidence-based view, then
the belief in a scientific conspiracy can provide an alternative
explanation for the consensus [18,20,21]. Moreover, because
conspiracist ideation need not conform to the criteria of
consistency and coherence that characterize scientific reasoning
[30], its explanatory reach is necessarily greater than that of
competing (scientific) theories [31]. Conspiracist ideation is also
typically immune to falsification because contradictory evidence
(e.g., climate scientists being exonerated of accusations) can be
accommodated by broadening the scope of the conspiracy
(exonerations are a whitewash), often with considerable creativity
[32]. Those cognitive attributes render conspiracist ideation
ideally suited for the ongoing rejection of scientific evidence.
Notwithstanding the growing prominence of conspiracist ideation
in science denial, broad-based empirical data on its role are
lacking. Our survey therefore also probed conspiracist ideation.
We related three potential predictors—endorsement of the free
market, conservatism-liberalism, and conspiracist ideation—to
people’s attitudes concerning three contentious scientific issues—
climate science, vaccinations, and GM foods. Each construct was
measured by a number of diverse items, thereby assaying people’s
general attitudes (e.g., towards vaccinations and GM foods
generally) rather than specific opinions (e.g., concerning HPV
immunization or ‘‘Roundup-ready’’ maize). All items other than
those targeting GM foods and vaccinations were used in previous
research (see Materials for details) and have a track record of
construct validity.
The conspiracist ideation items were sub-divided into those that
probed general conspiracies (e.g., ‘‘Princess Diana’s death was an
organized assassination’’) and others that probed specific scientific
conspiracies (‘‘The alleged link between second-hand tobacco
smoke and ill health reflects bogus and corrupt science’’). The
latter ‘‘convenience’’ theories illustrate the extent to which
rejection of a scientific proposition entails the belief that the
relevant evidence is the result of a conspiracy among scientists.
The former, general conspiracy items tap people’s overall
propensity for conspiracist ideation and show whether this general
cognitive style is associated with the rejection of scientific
propositions. Table 1 provides a verbatim list of all items together
with brief labels for the items (e.g., CYAIDS for ‘‘U.S. agencies
intentionally created the AIDS epidemic and administered it to
Black and gay men in the 1970s’’) that are used for presentation of
the results.
Results
Summary of the sample
Table 2 summarizes the 6 constructs that entered into our main
latent-variable analysis (see Materials and Methods section for details
of their construction). Figure 1 shows the underlying distributions
of the single-indicator composite scores. The apparent departure
from normality of the conspiracist ideation indicator is considered
during the SEM modeling via boot-strapping of confidence
intervals for the parameter estimates.
Table 3 provides a break-down of the distribution of responses
for all of the individual items.
Exploration of specific conspiracy theories relating to
scientific propositions
The convenience conspiracies were endorsed (i.e., ratings above
‘‘Neutral’’) by 200, 147, and 104 respondents (out of 1001), for
Table 1. Cont.
Item name Item (R = reverse scored)
7. Convenience conspiracy theories
CYClimChange The claim that the climate is changing due to emissions from fossil fuels is a hoax perpetrated by corrupt scientists who wish to spend
more taxpayer money on climate research.
CYAIDS U.S. agencies intentionally created the AIDS epidemic and administered it to Black and gay men in the 1970s.
CYTobacco The alleged link between second-hand tobacco smoke and ill health is based on bogus science and is an attempt by a corrupt cartel of
medical researchers to replace rational science with dogma.
8. Other sciences
CauseHIV The HIV virus causes AIDS.
CauseSmoke Smoking causes lung cancer.
CauseLead Lead in drinking water poses a serious long-term health risk.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075637.t001
Predictors of Rejection of Science
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Climate-Change-Hoax (CYClimChange), Tobacco-Lung Cancer-
Hoax (CYTobacco), and HIV-AIDS-Conspiracy (CYAIDS), respec-
tively.
The bivariate correlations between each convenience theory
and the corresponding item(s) querying the scientific proposition
were {0:569 for CYClimChange (correlated with the average
response to all 5 climate items),{0:111 for CYAIDS| CauseHIV,
and {0:333 for CYTobacco | CauseSmoking, respectively (all
p’sv:0005). The correlations confirm that rejection of scientific
propositions is often accompanied by endorsement of scientific
conspiracies pertinent to the proposition being rejected.
Modeling of science acceptance
Structural equation modeling (SEM; see Materials and Methods
section) examined the relationships between the constructs of
greatest interest, namely the worldview latent variables, general
conspiracist ideation, and climate change, vaccinations, and GM
foods. Figure 2 shows the overall SEM (Model 1) which fit very
well (x2(4)~12:18, p~:016, CFI ~:992, TLI= :968, RMSEA=
:045; 90% CI: :018{:075, SRMR= :019, AIC= 46:18) based on
conventional standards (CFI and TLI §.95 and RMSEA and
SRMR ƒ.06; [33]).
Not unexpectedly, free-market endorsement and conservatism
together strongly predicted rejection of climate science, with
standardized weights of{:32 and{:49, respectively. Acceptance
of GM foods, by contrast, was not associated with people’s
worldviews (weights set to zero without significant loss of fit;
Dx2(2)~4:8, p^:10). The relationship between worldviews and
attitudes towards vaccinations was more complex, with free-
market endorsement predicting rejection and conservatism pre-
dicting acceptance of vaccinations, respectively.
Table 4 shows that the bivariate correlations between each
of the worldview predictors (free market and conservatism
latent variables) and the acceptance of vaccinations were in
opposing directions but numerically small and non-significant.
The fact that those predictors carried considerable weight in
the SEM model (Figure 2) therefore merits exploration. Further
analysis revealed that the low bivariate correlations combined
with greater weights in the SEM likely reflected a suppressor
effect [34,35]. A suppressor variable mediates the association
between two other variables by suppressing criterion-irrelevant
variance in the predictor. In the present instance, we find
that much of the suppressor effect arises from the fact that
conservatism and free-market worldview are substantially and
positively correlated with each other (r~:811) but opposingly
(positively vs. negatively, respectively) associated with vaccina-
tions. In consequence, the bivariate correlations with
vaccinations are low (cf. Table 4) because, as far as each
predictor on its own is concerned, the large shared variance
between free-market and conservatism is ‘‘nuisance’’ variance—
that is, variance that is irrelevant to the prediction of
vaccination acceptance. Thus, when that criterion-irrelevant
variance for each predictor is suppressed by the other predictor
(as accomplished within the SEM model), the full strength of
each predictor is revealed.
In contrast to the clearly differentiated effects of worldview,
conspiracist ideation predicted rejection of all three scientific
issues, albeit to quite varying extents. Figure 2 shows that the link
was numerically strongest for vaccinations but also significant for
GM foods and climate science. Figure 1 showed that the
conspiracist-ideation single-indicator variable—unlike the others
in the model—departed notably from normality. The effect of
such departure from normality can be counteracted by construct-
ing confidence intervals for the parameter estimates by boot-
strapping [36]. The bootstrapped confidence intervals for the
model in Figure 2 did not materially alter any of the conclusions:
All regression weights reported in the figure retained their
significance, with the exception of the link between conservatism
and acceptance of vaccinations, which failed to reach conventional
significance levels (p~:068). We therefore explored the role of
worldview in vaccination acceptance further.
Because previous research has often relied on the free-market
construct alone [4,27], and because free-market endorsement and
conservatism had opposing effects on the acceptance of
vaccinations, we explored two additional models that iteratively
omitted one of the worldview constructs. The additional model
without conservatism (Model 2) also fit very well,
x2(3)~5:00,p~:172, CFI~:996, TLI = :987, RMSEA~:026;
90% CI: :000{:064, SRMR= :022, AIC= 29:00, with the
strength of the link between free-market endorsement and
rejection of climate science rising to {:70. The link between
free-market endorsement and rejection of vaccination declined in
magnitude, {:14, but retained its significance (pv:001). The
additional model without free-market endorsement (Model 3) fit
adequately, x2(3)~14:29,p~:003, CFI~:981, TLI = :936,
RMSEA~:061; 90% CI: :032{:095, SRMR= :020,
AIC= 38:30, with the strength of the link between conservatism
and rejection of climate science rising to {:76. The link between
conservatism and vaccination, by contrast, was no longer
significant, {:04,Z~{1:13,pw:10. The weights involving
conspiracist ideation remained virtually unchanged in these two
additional models (Models 2 and 3).
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics Associated with Indicator Composite Scores.
Variable M Skew Kurtosis Min Max SD S2 v (1{v)|S2
Climate 3.24 20.38 0.45 1 5 0.77 0.6 0.728 0.163
GM Food 2.84 20.10 0.31 1 5 0.73 0.54 0.773 0.121
Vaccines 3.70 20.51 0.68 1 5 0.74 0.54 0.707 0.160
Conservatism 3.18 0.48 0.55 1.14 5 0.70 0.5 0.659 0.169
Free Market 2.98 0.13 1.38 1 5 0.64 0.41 0.60 0.164
Conspiracist 2.37 0.37 20.22 1 5 0.87 0.75 0.844 0.117
Note. Composite scores are means across items on the 5-point scale.
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v
p
corresponds to the loading of a single-indicator manifest variable on its factor. (1{v)|S2
refers to the error variance of each single-indicator latent variable. For comparison, the corresponding Cronbach’s a’s for the Climate, GM Food, Vaccines, Conservatism,
Free Market, and Conspiracist composite scores were estimated at .781, .807, .778, .774, .667, and .842, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075637.t002
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Discussion
Worldviews and acceptance of science
We have shown that people’s political orientation and
worldview can present strong obstacles to acceptance of scientific
evidence, albeit to widely differing extents among the issues
examined. Worldviews once again constituted an overpowering
barrier to acceptance of climate science. Conservatism and free-
market endorsement were correlated but distinct constructs
(Model 1 in Figure 2), each of which contributed a substantial
share of variance to the rejection of climate science. When
considered in isolation, each worldview construct on its own
strongly predicted rejection of climate science (Models 2 and 3),
replicating much previous research and underscoring a formidable
challenge to science communicators [2–4,6,7,27].
Recent research has shown that the role of worldview may be
attenuated by underscoring the breadth of consensus among
scientists: When people are informed of the pervasive consensus
about the fundamentals of climate change, they become more
likely to endorse the basic premise of global warming, and they
attribute a larger share of the observed warming trend to human
CO2 emissions [37,38]. In one experimental study, underscoring
Figure 1. Frequency distributions of the single-indicator composite scores for all 6 constructs. Each histogram shows the distribution
across subjects of the single-indicator scores. Each variable represents the average responses across the constituent items on the 5-point from
‘Strongly Disagree’ (1) to ‘Strongly Agree’ (5), with ‘Neutral’ representing the midpoint.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075637.g001
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the consensus was particularly effective for people whose
worldview otherwise might have predisposed them towards
rejection of climate science [38]. This experimental result meshes
well with a detailed analysis of Republicans’ opinions on climate
change, which similarly revealed perceived consensus to be the
strongest predictor of acceptance of climate science [39].
For the other two scientific propositions, the role of worldview
was attenuated and more nuanced, or absent altogether.
Opposition to vaccinations involved a balance between two
opposing forces, namely a negative association with free-market
endorsement and a compensatory positive association with
conservatism. The different polarity of those associations is
consonant with the notion that libertarians object to the
government intrusion arising from mandatory vaccination pro-
grams [15], whereas people low on conservatism—who, by
implication, are liberal or progressive—may oppose immunization
because they distrust pharmaceutical companies [40]. The latter
link, however, was far from overwhelming: When conservatism
Table 3. Distribution of responses to survey items.
Item Name Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
CNatFluct 152 (15.2) 353 (35.3) 235 (23.5) 218 (21.8) 43 (4.3)
CdueGHG 47 (4.7) 129 (12.9) 359 (35.9) 355 (35.5) 111 (11.1)
CseriousDamage 46 (4.6) 110 (11) 279 (27.9) 401 (40.1) 165 (16.5)
CO2causesCC 57 (5.7) 154 (15.4) 390 (39) 315 (31.5) 85 (8.5)
HumansInsign 64 (6.4) 151 (15.1) 241 (24.1) 352 (35.2) 193 (19.3)
GMimportant 74 (7.4) 201 (20.1) 403 (40.3) 254 (25.4) 69 (6.9)
GMdamageEnv 68 (6.8) 240 (24) 454 (45.4) 190 (19) 49 (4.9)
GMtested 70 (7) 201 (20.1) 434 (43.4) 243 (24.3) 53 (5.3)
GMdangerous 142 (14.2) 380 (38) 323 (32.3) 130 (13) 26 (2.6)
GMsafe 113 (11.3) 266 (26.6) 423 (42.3) 165 (16.5) 34 (3.4)
VaxSafe 26 (2.6) 48 (4.8) 163 (16.3) 469 (46.9) 295 (29.5)
VaxNegSide 54 (5.4) 120 (12) 252 (25.2) 379 (37.9) 196 (19.6)
VaxTested 32 (3.2) 89 (8.9) 278 (27.8) 455 (45.5) 147 (14.7)
VaxRisky 50 (5) 146 (14.6) 295 (29.5) 309 (30.9) 201 (20.1)
VaxContribHealth 23 (2.3) 56 (5.6) 178 (17.8) 454 (45.4) 290 (29)
PLiberal 107 (10.7) 230 (23) 332 (33.2) 205 (20.5) 127 (12.7)
PRepub 178 (17.8) 217 (21.7) 341 (34.1) 162 (16.2) 103 (10.3)
PCommunismFailed 18 (1.8) 72 (7.2) 307 (30.7) 354 (35.4) 250 (25)
PNeverConserv 70 (7) 150 (15) 379 (37.9) 236 (23.6) 166 (16.6)
PMediaLeft 65 (6.5) 186 (18.6) 474 (47.4) 181 (18.1) 95 (9.5)
PSocialismOK 46 (4.6) 189 (18.9) 416 (41.6) 207 (20.7) 143 (14.3)
PLeft 65 (6.5) 186 (18.6) 474 (47.4) 181 (18.1) 95 (9.5)
FMUnresBest 67 (6.7) 176 (17.6) 394 (39.4) 278 (27.8) 86 (8.6)
FMLimitSocial 76 (7.6) 294 (29.4) 455 (45.5) 138 (13.8) 38 (3.8)
FMMoreImp 62 (6.2) 239 (23.9) 420 (42) 218 (21.8) 62 (6.2)
FMThreatEnv 64 (6.4) 270 (27) 391 (39.1) 200 (20) 76 (7.6)
FMUnsustain 57 (5.7) 198 (19.8) 467 (46.7) 208 (20.8) 71 (7.1)
CYNewWorldOrder 240 (24) 259 (25.9) 318 (31.8) 120 (12) 64 (6.4)
CYMLK 276 (27.6) 279 (27.9) 294 (29.4) 104 (10.4) 48 (4.8)
CYMoon 492 (49.2) 267 (26.7) 165 (16.5) 51 (5.1) 26 (2.6)
CYJFK 172 (17.2) 192 (19.2) 311 (31.1) 224 (22.4) 102 (10.2)
CY911 401 (40.1) 259 (25.9) 195 (19.5) 87 (8.7) 59 (5.9)
CYDiana 273 (27.3) 260 (26) 290 (29) 118 (11.8) 60 (6)
CYClimChange 257 (25.7) 304 (30.4) 240 (24) 127 (12.7) 73 (7.3)
CYAIDS 447 (44.7) 258 (25.8) 192 (19.2) 65 (6.5) 39 (3.9)
CYTobacco 343 (34.3) 298 (29.8) 213 (21.3) 103 (10.3) 44 (4.4)
CauseHIV 10 (1) 43 (4.3) 122 (12.2) 378 (37.8) 448 (44.8)
CauseSmoking 6 (0.6) 23 (2.3) 99 (9.9) 352 (35.2) 521 (52)
CauseLead 152 (15.2) 353 (35.3) 235 (23.5) 218 (21.8) 43 (4.3)
Note. Table entries are numbers of responses (and percentages). See Table 1 for wording of items.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075637.t003
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was considered on its own (Model 3), it was no longer associated
with vaccination rejection. Conversely, free-market endorsement
on its own (Model 2) predicted rejection of vaccinations, albeit
more weakly than when both constructs were present (Model 1).
The clear differentiation between conservatism and free-market
worldviews with respect to vaccinations is notable in light of their
strong bivariate correlation (cf. Table 4). Although conservatism
and libertarian worldviews tend to be perceived as allied or nearly
synonymous when viewed through the conventional ‘‘right vs. left’’
political lens, recent research has begun to differentiate libertarian
worldviews from conservatism [41].
Finally, opposition to GM foods was not associated with the
worldview constructs. This result is striking in light of reports in
the media [10] that have linked opposition to GM foods with the
political Left based on statements by political figures. Our results
provide no evidence that this link holds in the American
population at large. This finding is consonant with the fact that
among liberals trust in science has remained high and stable since
the 1970s [1]. Our data suggest that this high level of trust in
science among liberals extended to GM foods. We therefore do
not find much evidence for the view that the motivated rejection of
scientific findings is symmetrical on both the political Left and the
Right, such that liberals reject GM foods because their close
association with multinational corporations challenges their values
in the same way that the regulatory implications of climate science
challenges conservatives [11]. Instead, our results appear more
congruent with a politically asymmetric view of the role of
ideology in the rejection of science. On this view, the driving
psychological force that is underlying the rejection of science is
‘‘system justification’’ [42,43]; that is, a person’s need to perceive
the current political and economic system as fair, legitimate, and
stable. According to the system justification view, scientific findings
are rejected by people high in system justification when the
evidence challenges the status quo [42], rather than on the basis of
ideology per se. Hence, because system justification tends to be
greater among conservatives than liberals [42], climate science is
primarily rejected by people on the political right because they
tend to be particularly concerned with system justification and
hence respond to the threat to the economic status quo that might
arise from climate mitigation efforts. By contrast, GM foods are
not rejected based on ideology because they do not imperil the
economic status quo, thereby eliminating system justification as a
driving variable for rejection. We add the cautionary note that
although our sample was representative, it may not have included
a sufficiently large number of participants at the extreme end of
the ideological spectrum. It is therefore possible that small specific
groups on the political left do indeed reject certain scientific
findings—such as GM foods or vaccinations—as is suggested by
the public rhetoric of spokespersons that are identified as ‘‘left-
wing’’ [10,11].
In summary, although a free-market worldview is a powerful
predictor of the rejection of scientific findings that have regulatory
implications such as climate science, we found its effect to be far
from general: The involvement of worldview in vaccinations was
arguably small, and it was entirely absent for GM foods.
Nonetheless, it must be reiterated that we found limited evidence
for the rejection of vaccinations based on liberal or ‘‘left-wing’’
political leanings: When free-market worldviews are parceled out
(and only then), people on the political left were less likely to
endorse childhood vaccinations than people on the political right.
Conspiracist ideation vs. scientific cognition
Unlike worldview, conspiracist ideation predicted rejection of all
scientific propositions, albeit to varying extents. Given that none of
the conspiracy items had any direct bearing on the propositions
under consideration (recall that ‘‘convenience’’ theories were not
considered in the SEM), the data provide further evidence for the
link between the rejection of science and a conspiratorial cognitive
style in general [18–20,27].
This association is arguably not coincidental and of theoretical
and practical significance. We noted at the outset that conspiracist
ideation can provide an alternative explanation for a pervasive
scientific consensus, a role that is arguably reflected in the pairwise
Figure 2. Structural Equation Model summarizing the data
(Model 1). All links and correlations shown are standardized and
significant; all pv:003 except the link between Conservatism and
Vaccinations; Z~2:27, pv:03. Manifest variables and their loadings,
and disturbances on endogenous factors, are not shown. Links between
latent variables that are not shown are constrained to zero. Loadings
and variances of single-indicator manifest variables are not shown and
are reported in Table 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075637.g002
Table 4. Correlations among the 6 latent variables retained
for the Structural Equation Modeling.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
1 Conspiracist ideation –
2 Free Market 2.142 –
3 Conservatism 2.125 .811 –
4 GM Food 2.129 .091 (.004) –
5 Vaccinations 2.521 (2.038) (.052) .387 –
6 Climate 2.089 2.674 2.730 (2.076) .126
Note. All correlations except those enclosed in parentheses are significant
(pv:05). The bivariate correlations between acceptance of vaccinations and the
Free Market and Conservatism predictors, respectively, were small and non-
significant. See text for explanation why those predictors were nonetheless
significant in the SEM model (Figure 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075637.t004
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negative correlations between the ‘‘convenience’’ theories (CY-
ClimChange), CYTobacco, and CYAIDS) and the corresponding
scientific propositions. It must be noted that the magnitude of
those correlations was quite substantial, with CYClimChange
explaining a third of the variance in the acceptance of climate
science (bivariate r~{:569; r2~:33). However, conspiracist
ideation typically is not limited to individual theories but
represents a broader cognitive style or personality attribute.
People who endorse one conspiracy are known to be likely to also
endorse multiple others; thus, the belief that AIDS was created by
the government has often been found to be accompanied by the
conviction that the FBI killed Martin Luther King or that MI6
killed Princess Diana [44,45]. We found a similar convergence of
beliefs here (cf. Table 5). In further support of a fairly general
disposition towards a conspiracist style, it has been shown that
endorsement of conspiracy theories is also associated with people’s
own willingness to engage in a conspiracy themselves when
deemed necessary [46]. It is not surprising, therefore, that
conspiracist ideation has been found to be associated with stable
personality variables, such as a subset of the ‘Big Five’ [45] or
paranoid ideation and schizotypy [47]. We nonetheless prefer to
view conspiracist ideation as a cognitive style rather than a
potential personality trait because if conspiracist ideation is
considered at a cognitive level, its analysis can reveal why it is
antithetical to scientific reasoning in several ways.
For example, whereas coherence is a hallmark of most scientific
theories, the simultaneous belief in mutually contradictory
theories—e.g., that Princess Diana was murdered but faked her
own death—is a notable aspect of conspiracist ideation [30].
Accordingly, arguments against mainstream climate science are
often mutually contradictory, as noted in the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency’s response to comments on its endangerment
finding pertaining to greenhouse gases [48]. Second, conspiracy
theories rely on isolated morsels of evidence inconsistent with an
official account [31] (e.g., that Timothy McVeigh fled the
Oklahoma City bombing in a car without licence plates) while
ignoring overwhelming evidence to the contrary (e.g., the full
documented history leading up to the bombing). Accordingly, anti-
vaccination activists ignore overwhelming statistical evidence while
focusing on anecdotes or information that has been shown to be
false [49]. Finally, in a reversal of conventional scientific
reasoning, evidence against conspiracy theories is often construed
as evidence for them, because the evidence is interpreted as arising
from the conspiracy in question. This interpretation relies on the
notion that, the stronger the evidence against a conspiracy, the
more the conspirators must want people to believe their version of
events [31,32]. This self-sealing reasoning can engender baroque
theories that are bedazzling in their complexity. For example,
when a component of the numerous 9/11 theories became
untenable—i.e., that no plane hit the Pentagon—the very fact that
the no-plane theory was false was weaved into a larger 9/11
conspiracy: Specifically, the new over-arching theory held that the
problem with the no-plane theory was that it was too transparently
false to have been true. Thus the no-plane theory must have been
a straw man initially planted by the government whose falsification
was planned in order to discredit the over-arching theory that 9/
11 was an inside job [32].
The resistance of conspiracist ideation to contrary evidence
renders its prominence in the rejection of science particularly
troubling, because providing additional scientific information may
only amplify the rejection of such evidence, rather than foster its
acceptance. Instead, conspiracist misconceptions of scientific issues
are best met by indirect means, such as affirmation of the
competence and character of proponents of conspiracy theories, or
affirmation of other beliefs they hold dearly [32,50]. Such self-
affirmation is known to facilitate the dislodging of attitudes in
response to information that would otherwise be considered too
threatening [51]. Alternatively, efforts should be made to rebut
many conspiracy theories at the same time because multiple
rebuttals raise the complexity of possible conspiracist responses,
thereby rendering it increasingly baroque and less believable to
anyone outside a committed circle of conspiracy theorists [32].
In summary, several attributes of the cognition underlying
conspiracist ideation run counter to conventional scientific thinking.
The prominence of conspiracist ideation in the rejection of science
should therefore not be unexpected. Knowledge of its involvement
is crucial to permit scientists and communicators to respond
appropriately to the rejection of evidence by segments of the public.
Worldviews and conspiracist ideation: Birds of a feather?
What is the relationship between our two principal predictors,
worldviews and conspiracist ideation? Our main SEM model
showed a negative association between conspiracy theorizing and
conservatism (as well as with free-market endorsement), suggesting
that conspiratorial thinking is more prevalent on the political left
than the right. This association is not without related precedent
[45], but it is also not universal: The reverse association has also
been found, whereby conspiratorial belief was linked to right-wing
authoritarianism [52]. The directional lability of the association
with political views may arise because some specific conspiracies
are favored among the political left (e.g., that 9/11 was ‘‘an inside
job’’) whereas others (e.g., that President Obama was not born in
the United States) are favored among the political right [53].
Depending on the balance of test items, different studies may thus
yield associations with political orientation that are of different
polarity. We suggest that it would be premature to tie conspiracist
ideation firmly to one side of politics or the other, and that this
issue awaits adjudication by further systematic research.
There is, however, an over-arching conceptual link between
cultural worldviews and conspiratorial thinking: Irrespective of
their statistical association (or lack thereof), they both arguably
represent mechanisms of motivated reasoning. Motivated reason-
ing refers to the discounting of information or evidence that
Table 5. Model Fit Statistics and Indices Associated with the
Single-Factor Measurement Models.
Model x2 df SRMR CFI TLI RMSEA AIC
Climate1 11.35 4 .016 .996 .989 .043 33.35
GM Food2 11.92 4 .016 .995 .988 .044 33.92
Vaccines3 12.14 4 .016 .995 .987 .045 34.14
Conservatism4 105.22 12 .039 .950 .913 .088 137.22
Free Market5 10.01 4 .020 .994 .985 .039 32.04
Conspiracist6 77.13 9 .032 .968 .947 .087 101.13
Notes. 1 single-factor model with one correlated residual between the CNatFluct
and HumansInsign items (r~:39,pv:001; see Table 0 for explanation of variable
names); 2 single-factor model with one correlated residual between the
GMdamageEnv and GMdangerous items (r~:36,pv:001); 3 single-factor model
with one correlated residual between the VaxNegSide and VaxRiskyVax items
(r~:45,pv:001); 4 single-factor model with two correlated residuals: one
between the PRepub and PMediaLeft items (r~:24,pv:001), and one between
the PCommunismFailed and PSocialismOK items (r~:19,pv:001); 5 single-factor
model with one correlated residual between the FMUnresBest and FMMoreImp
items (r~:44,pv:001); 6 no correlated residuals were added to this single-factor
model.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0075637.t005
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challenges one’s prior beliefs accompanied by uncritical accep-
tance of anything that is attitude-consonant [54–56]. In the
context of science denial, the present study and related precedents
[2–7,18–21,27] have identified worldviews and conspiracist
ideation as two vehicles with which such motivated reasoning is
exercised. These general and robust findings help identify
communicative means by which the motivated reasoning can be
attenuated or circumvented [5,32,38,50]. However, from a basic
cognitive perspective, the next question of interest is to examine
why people hold the worldviews they do, thereby going beyond a
descriptive role of worldview to an explanatory account of the
underlying cognitions and beliefs. Initial work in this direction has
been promising [41,57,58].
Materials and Methods
Materials
The survey comprised 39 items, plus queries of age and gender
and an attention filter question (‘‘select Neutral’’). Age turned out
not to correlate with any of the indicator variables, and although
gender exhibited some small associations, its inclusion as a
potential mediator in the SEM model (Figure 2) did not alter
the outcome (largest change in any standardized beta weight
ƒ j:01j.) We therefore did not consider those variables further.
All items were rated on the following 5-point rating scale: 1 =
‘Strongly Disagree’, 2 = ‘Disagree’, 3 = ‘Neutral’, 4 = ‘Agree’,
and 5= ‘Strongly Agree.’ There were 5 items, designed for this
study but derived from relevant precedents [27,38] for each of the
principal scientific issues; viz. climate, GM foods, and vaccina-
tions. The potential predictor constructs were all based on
established instruments that have been repeatedly used in previous
research: free-market endorsement was measured by 5 items [4];
conservatism-liberalism by 7 items [59]; and conspiracist ideation
by 6 items drawn from previous research [27,45].
A further 3 items queried scientific propositions that were also
used in previous research [27,38]. Specifically, those items queried
the link between HIV and AIDS, the link between smoking and
lung cancer, and the link between lead in drinking water and
adverse health effects. In addition, 3 items queried ‘‘convenience’’
conspiracies pertaining to specific scientific issues; viz. that climate
change is a hoax, that AIDS was intentionally created by the U.S.
Government, and that the link between smoking and lung cancer
is based on bogus science.
Approximately half the items measuring each construct (except
conspiracist ideation) were phrased such that a positive response
reflected stronger endorsement, with the polarity reversed for the
other half. Items were reverse-scored where necessary so that
numerically greater scores represented greater endorsement. For
the bipolar conservatism-liberalism construct, greater endorsement
reflected greater conservatism.
Questions were presented blocked by topic area in two different
orders that were randomly assigned to participants. Table 1
presents items in one order; the other order reversed the sequence.
Participants and procedure
A sample of 1,001 U.S. residents was recruited in early June
2012 via electronic invitations by Qualtrics.com, a firm that
specializes in representative internet surveys. Participants were
drawn from a completely bipartisan panel of more than 5.5 million
U.S. residents (as of January 2013), via propensity weighting to
ensure representativeness. The panel from which participants were
sampled is maintained by uSamp.com. Details about the panel
and the sampling method can be found on the uSamp.com web
page.
Participants were compensated by Qualtrics with cash-
equivalent points. A total of 1,383 respondents entered the survey
page. Of those, 74 did not enter a single response, and a further
308 either failed the attention-filter question or did not complete
all items. Only participants who completed all items and passed
the attention-filter question were retained for analysis. Median age
of respondents retained for analysis was 43.0 (Q1: 30.0, Q3: 55.0).
There were 501 male and 500 female respondents. The data set is
available at the first author’s webpage, www.cogsciwa.com.
Ethics statement
The Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Western Australia approved the procedure in conformance with
the The National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research, which
is jointly promulgated by the National Health and Medical
Research Council (NHMRC), the Australian Research Council
(ARC), and Universities Australia (UA). The survey was prefixed
by an introductory information sheet outlining the research.
Participants indicated their informed consent by proceeding to the
survey questions after reading this information sheet.
Latent variable modeling
Our principal analysis used structural equation modeling
(SEM). Thus, each construct of interest was represented by a
latent variable estimated from the responses to the corresponding
multiple items. As latent variables are free of measurement error,
none of the estimated effects are attenuated due to measurement
error [60]. Alternative methods of analysis, such as multiple
regression based on composite scores with less than perfect
reliability, yield results contaminated by measurement error which
make their interpretation difficult [61].
SEM models with more than 20 indicator variables (i.e., items)
are often too large to achieve adequate levels of model fit [62].
Item parceling serves to overcome this problem by averaging the
item scores measuring each construct into a single-indicator
variable for SEM. One criticism of item parceling is that it may
obscure multi-dimensionality [63]. To preempt this criticism, we
modeled each hypothesized latent variable (predictors such as
conservatism and criterion variables such as acceptance of
vaccinations) individually based on all of its respective items to
determine their dimensionality. All six latent variables exhibited an
essentially unidimensional structure (Table 5). In nearly all cases
the addition of 1 correlated error term to the single-factor model
was sufficient for a very respectable fit (CFI §.95 and SRMR
ƒ.06; [33]). The only exception was the conservatism construct
which included two correlated error terms.
Having confirmed essentially unidimensional structures, we
modeled each construct via single-indicator latent variables
[64,65]. In single-indicator models, each latent variable is defined
by one indicator consisting of an equally-weighted composite of
the items within a scale (i.e., the sum or mean of the item scores).
Equally weighted composites scores, rather than factor scores,
were used for two principal reasons: (1) when all of the items load
positively and roughly equally onto the factor, as was the case in
this instance, there are no practical benefits to using factor scores
[66]. In confirmation, the lowest observed correlation between
factor scores and composite scores in this study was :99 across all
latent variables. (2) The estimation of internal consistency
reliability of unequally weighted composite scores is more
complicated and less well-established [67].
The true score variance for each latent variable is obtained by
constraining the single-indicator’s error variance to: (1{
reliability)|S2, where S2 is equal to the composite score’s total
variance [65]. Although Cronbach’s a is frequently used to
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estimate the reliability (or true score variance) of each single-
indicator variable, Cronbach’s a assumes essential t-equivalence
and independent error variances [68]. A more accurate estimator
free of those assumptions is v [69,70], which was used here. As per
Cronbach’s a, v represents the ratio of true-score variance to total
variance; however, it is estimated within a factor-analytic model
[71]. Specifically, the individual measurement models were used to
estimate the v coefficients associated with each latent variable’s
single indicator [70] (see Table 2).
The error variances of the indicators were set to the values
shown in Table 2, and the structural models for the latent
variables (cf. Figure 2) were estimated using Amos 20.0.
The correlation matrix for the 6 latent variables is shown in
Table 4.
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